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PERSPECTIVES FROM THE U.S.A. 
ABSTRACT 
About one-fifth of U.S. farmers are experiencing moderate to 
severe financial problems due to low income, declining land 
values and high interest rates. These problems are largely 
attributable to the world-wide economic recession of the early 
1980s. U.S. agricultural lenders are struggling with record 
amounts of loan losses and loan servicing costs. Government 
policy responses have included higher price supports, farm debt 
restructuring and improvements in government crop insurance. 
Financial market innovations that would respond to income and 
interest rate variability include modifications to traditional 
farm debt instruments and improved equity capital markets for 
farm investments. The U.S. experience offers insights for 
countries that have not yet experienced the full weight of such 
difficulties and the solutions attempted may also be applicable 
elsewhere. 
FINANCING AGRICULTURE IN A TURBULENT WORLD ECONOMY: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE U.S.A. 
Introduction 
With about one-quarter of their output exported, U.S. 
farmers are directly affected by turbulence in the world economy. 
The purpose of this paper is to summarize recent agricultural 
credit problems in the U.S. and outline some solutions that are 
being explored. The U.S. experience offers insights for 
countries that have not yet experienced the full weight of such 
difficulties. The solutions attempted may also be applicable 
elsewhere. In the following sections, the problems of farmers 
and lenders are summarized, recent responses to these problems 
are described, and financial innovations are suggested. 
Origins and Extent of farm financial Problems. 
The agricultural recession of the 1980s is generally 
attributed to three factors. first, U.S. domestic prices for 
major agricultural export commodities declined due largely to a 
strong dollar and weakened demand caused by the world recession 
and higher debt servicing on importing countries' borrowings. 
Second, interest rates charged on new farm loans more than 
doubled between 1979 and 1981 due to restrictive monetary 
policies, a growing government budget deficit and financial 
market deregulation. Third, some parts of the U.S. experienced 
two or three consecutive years of adverse growing conditions. 
These reversals in farmers' fortunes were especially severe 
because they followed seven years of virtually uninterrupted 
pr,lsperity. The 1970s "boom" in U.S. agriculture that began with 
the massive 1973 grain sale to the USSR was characterized by low, 
and at times negative, real interest rates, generally rising 
commodity prices and sharply rising farm land values. These 
conditions encouraged many farmers to expand their operations 
with borrowed funds. By 1980, highly leveraged farming 
operations were vulnerable to the unforseen recession that was to 
follow. 
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Impacts on Farmers. 
Falling farm incomes and land values, and rising interest 
rates obviously had their most severe impacts on farmers with 
high debt loads; however, all farmers have suffered to some 
degree. Melichar (Jan., 1984) estimated that by January 1, 1984, 
one-fifth of U.S. farmers, those with debt:asset ratios above 
0.4, were experiencing financial stress. About 8 percent of all 
farmers had debt:asset ratios above 0.7, which is indicative of 
very severe financial difficulty. Financial stress in U.S. 
agriculture is concentrated among younger farmers with larger, 
"commercial" scale operations; hence, operators experiencing 
financial stress account for a disproportionately high share of 
total farm debt. The one-fifth of all farmers experiencing 
stress accounted for over three-fifths of total farm debt. The 
corollary is that over four-fifths of U.S. farmers are relatively 
financially secure, but less than two-fifths of total farm debt 
is owed by this group. Financially secure farmers generally tend 
to be older operators with small, part-time units. 
Financial stress in agriculture has not been limited to 
farmers. Private and cooperatively owned farm marketing and 
supply firms have struggled with lower sales volume, higher 
interest rates and increased bad-debt losses on accounts 
receivable. The financial woes of multi-national companies such 
as International Harvester and Massey Ferguson attest to the 
severity of the recession on farm machinery manufacturers and 
dealers. 
Impacts on Agricultural Lenders. 
After nearly a half-century of favorable experience in farm 
lending , many agricultural lenders had to cope with unpre-
cedented levels of loan losses and loan servicing costs beginning 
in 1981. Lenders' problems in farm lending were compounded by 
changing regulations and increased volatility in interest rates. 
Analyses in mid-1983 (Barry and Lee; Hughes) indicated 
that the impacts of farm credit problems on agricultural lenders 
were serious but manageable. This overall assessment was still 
largely true as of year-end 1984, although the situation con-
tinued to deteriorate. The incidence of delinquencies, liqui-
dations, customers discontinued, foreclosures, bankruptcies and 
workouts were reported at 2 to 5 times pre-1980 numbers, with 
wide variations geographically and between lenders. Recall, 
however, that pre-1980 farm loan problems were negligible when 
compared with nonfarm lending experience. In 1984, delinquent 
farm loans represented about 5 percent of total farm loans, and 
net farm loan charge-offs were about 1 percent of total farm 
loans outstanding. 
Although most farm lenders have had sufficient reserves to 
absorb these losses, a few have failed. Of the 27 U.S. 
commercial banks that failed in the second quarter of 1984, 10 
were agricultural banks, with farm loan:total loan ratios above 
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0.25. Moreover, a growing number of agricultural banks have 
delinquent loan volumes that exceed their capital accounts. 
(Melichar, October 1984). 
The Cooperative Farm Credit System lenders are also exper-
iencing difficultie5, with severe problems occurring in some 
Production Credit Associations (PCA's). In 9 of the 12 Farm 
Credit Districts, at least one PCA was involved in liquidation as 
of mid-1984. In addition, several PCAs across the country are 
utilizing the system-wide loss-sharing provision developed in 
1978. Under this provision, associations whose capital accounts 
are imperiled by loan losses receive assistance from their 
financially stronger counterparts. 
The farmers Home Administration (FmHA), the only government 
farm lender in the U.S., has experienced increased loan servicing 
problems, and an increased demand for new loans, consistent with 
their "lender of last resort" role. FmHA loans now account for 
over 12 percent of total farm loans outstanding, double their 
market share of ten years ago. Ironically, much of this growth 
occurred during the relatively prosperous late 1970s. Their 
ability to respond to the current recession has been diminished 
somewhat by budgetary restrictions and political pressures (Barry 
and Lee). 
Farm financial stress has obviously created serious con-
flicts between borrowers and their lenders. To the extent 
possible, all lenders have exercised "forebearance"; every 
effort is made to salvage delinquent borrowers' businesses or 
reach mutually acceptable agreements for a voluntary full or 
partial liquidation. In many cases, however, foreclosure, 
bankruptcy or other legal remedies must be used. A few violent 
confrontations have attracted considerable attention from the 
news media, and while the numbers are small, the public has been 
led to believe that many young farmers are being unfairly forced 
out of business by their creditors. 
In addition to a policy of forebearance, U.S. agricultural 
lenders have imposed significantly higher credit standards on new 
and previous borrowers. Financial ratio and cash-flow require-
ments used during a period of rising incomes and asset values and 
low interest rates proved to be too lenient in recent years. 
Borrowers are now asked to provide more collateral and signi-
ficantly more financial information. Some farmers accuse their 
lenders of changing the "rules of the game". It would probably be 
more accurate to say that the long-standing rules of sound credit 
extension are now being more strictly enforced. 
Government Policy Responses. 
Widespread publicity coupled with the contributing roles of 
monetary and fiscal policies virtually demanded a response to 
farmers' financial problems by the government. U.S. government 
involvement in price and income policies was reactivated in the 
form of the 1983 Payment-in-Kind (PIK) program after a decade of 
near laissez-faire treatment of agriculture. PIK was an acreage 
reduction program for major crops under which producers who 
reduced acreage were reimbursed with actual commodities instead 
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of direct government payments. Unfortunately, there was a major 
drought in 1983 and the re~ulting increase in commodity prices 
made PIK the most costly agricultural program in history--$22 
billion, which was approximately equal to total U.S. net farm 
income that year. 
In 1984, U.S. farm policy shifted to a more narrowly 
targeted focus on those farmers actually experiencing financial 
stress. The fmHA's budget was increased and a debt restructuring 
program was announced. The key Features of debt-restructuring 
are: 
(1) a setaside on fmHA loans of up to 25 percent (or 
$200,000, whichever is less) of principal and interest due for a 
period of up to five years, 
(2) ninety percent loan guarantees for commercial lenders 
who permanently write off at least 10 percent of principal and 
interest due, 
(3) expanded management and financial services for farmers 
and loan servicing assistance f•>r commercial lenders from FmHA, 
and 
(4) eligibility is limited to those who gain sufficient 
rel1ef from the setaside or write off to meet projected cash flow 
commitments, with a 10 percent margin for unanticipated expenses. 
(Harl). 
It remains to be seen whether a debt-restructuring program 
will be effective or workable. It's main advantage is that it is 
an attempt to reach only those who need assistance instead of 
increasing all farmers' incomes to save a few. At worst, it may 
become an administrative nightmare. Deciding who is eligible and 
determining which operators can meet the cash-flow feasibility 
test is going to be a very arbitrary procedure. 
In response to crop yield variability, further modifications 
were made in the multiple peril crop insurance program (Lee and 
Djogo). The U.S. government began a limited, voluntary crop 
insurance program in 1938 with the creation of the Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation (fCIC). Since 1980 there has been a major 
effort to increase participation through more individualized 
coverages allowing above average producers to purchase higher 
yield guarantees than can be obtained under the traditional area 
yield plan. Participation has increased in response to these 
modifications; however, crop insurance reduces only one of 
several risks facing farmers and is, therefore, only a partial 
solution to farm financial stress. 
Financial Market Innovations 
Two approaches have been suggested for improving farmers' 
capacities to meet cash flow commitments in the face of unstable 
incomes and interest rates. One is to build more flexibility 
lnto farm debt instruments. The second is to increase the flow 
of equity capital into Financially troubled farms. 
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Indexed or flexible payment debt instruments would allow the 
debt servicing commitment to vary with net income so that cash 
surpluses from good years are reserved for bad ones (Lee and 
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Vdriabl~-rdti-> loan contracls. The mdjor problem with var1able-
rate lending is that the reduct1on in interest rate risk is 
largely offset by an increase in default risk. A relatively 
simple procedure for reducing the impacts of changing interest 
rates is to eliminate or minimize variations in the loan payment 
by allowing the loan term to vary. Most lenders could also fix 
interest rates by matching the term structure of their own assets 
and liabilities, although this is difficult to achieve in 
practice. The recent emergence of financial futures markets 
offers another method of removing interest rate risk; however, 
few U.S. agricultural lenders have used this tool (Heffernan). 
Most farmers experiencing financial qtress share a common 
problem--too much debt and too little equity. Since real estate 
dominates most farm balance sheets, infusions of equity capital 
require shared ownership of the land. Outside ownership of 
farmland is contrary to strongly held beliefs and values; 
however, as we have observed recently, many farm owner-operators 
could not tolerate the low and unstable current return to land. 
Longer run financ1al stability in agriculture may require 
more separation of land ownership and management. This sugges-
tion brings out fears of absentee, corporate or foreign owner-
ship; however, most farm landlords in the U.S. are retired 
farmers or their families who reside locally. There may be 
cost-effective tax or other policies that would encourage more 
retiring farmers to leave their equity in agriculture instead of 
disinvesting. 
Another possibility to consider is a secondary market for 
farm real estate. A "mutual fund"for farmland would take the 
lumpiness out of farmland investments. Farmers could more easily 
expand or contract their operations, and they could adjust their 
real estate holdings by exercising a buy-back clause or by 
purchasing shares of the fund. Owners would benefit from 
increased marketability and diversification. Attempts in the 
U.S. to use this approach failed because of strong opposition 
from farm organizations. The common objections are that land 
ownership would become concentrated in the hands of outsiders, 
that land prices would be unfairly bid up and that family farmers 
would be farced out. It can be argued, however, that just the 
opposite would occur. Outside equity would offer family farmers 
additional financial stability which would tend to keep them in 
business during recessions, rather than force them out. 
Summary and Conclusions. 
About one-fifth of U.S. farmers are experiencing moderate to 
severe financial stress following four years of low incomes, 
declining asset values and high interest rates. Although the 
outlook for some improvement is cautiously optimistic, no 
dramatic turnaround is forecast. Methods and programs for 
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financing agricult11re must address the problems of current 
distress as well as serve an industry that, over the long run, is 
characterized by income instability and low current returns to 
investments. 
Policy responses to current problems should take the form of 
targeted assistance to those experiencing financial distress. 
Carefully designed debt restructuring and counseling on a case 
by case basis are possibilities. Costly programs that benefit 
all farmers in order to save a few should be avoided, and so too 
should foreclosure moratoria and other interventions that could 
deny lenders their legitimate rights to secured claims. 
Modified debt instruments would help farmers cope with low 
and unstable incomes; however, long-run financial stability will 
depend on greater amounts of equity, not debt, capital. Tax or 
other incentives could be offered to retiring operators to 
encourage them to leave their money invested in agriculture. It 
may also be possible to develop a secondary market for farm real 
estate without compromising social and efficiency goals. 
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